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FEDERALISM, THE MANN ACT, AND THE
IMPERATIVE TO DECRIMINALIZE PROSTITUTION
Michael Conantt
I. INTRODUCTION
The Mann Act of 1910 makes it a felony knowingly to transport women
or girls in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of prostitution,
debauchery, or any other immoral purpose.' A 1986 amendment deleted
"debauchery" and "immoral purpose" and substituted "any sexual activity for
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense."2 The original
statute was the product of an era of moral panic in the early twentieth century
that has long since passed.3 Although the statute was aimed at pimps and
panderers, the Supreme Court broadly construed it to apply to customers of
prostitutes and the prostitutes themselves as conspirators. The limited
enforcement since World War II, both before and after the 1986 amendment,
is recognition that the statute caused great harm and had little deterrent effect.
Thus, any rational analysis of the history of the Mann Act leads to the
conclusion that it is ready for repeal.
Repeal of the Mann Act could be the first step in a campaign to decrimi-
nalize prostitution. The AIDS epidemic makes regulating prostitution more
compelling today than ever before, and health regulation can effectively occur
only after decriminalization. The question, therefore, is whether prostitution,
an act that most people consider immoral, but that has not been significantly
deterred by its illegal status, should be decriminalized so that the government
can institute necessary health regulations. It is uncertain, however, whether
politicians who realize the need for decriminalization can afford to invest
capital in a fight against the leaders of the religious right who oppose decrimi-
nalization.
t Professor Emeritus, Walter A. Haas School of Business, University of California at
Berkeley, Member of the Illinois bar.
136 Stat 825 (1910), as amended 18 U.S.C.A. §2421(supp. 1992). In 1986, Congress
replaced"women" or "girls" with "individuals" so that the statute applied both to procurers of
both sexes. 100 Stat. 3511 (1986). See S. Rep. 99-194, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). This
amendment is not testimony to the continued public interest in this archaic statute, but instead
was a response to the argument that all federal statutes should be gender-neutral.
2Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3511-2.
3
FREDERrIcKKGRrrNER, WHrm SLAVERY: MYTH, IDEOLOGY, AND AMERICAN LAW 61-
75 (1990); DAvID LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALT'Y AND THE
MANN AcT 1-14 (1994).
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This analysis begins with a survey of the economics of prostitution.
Decriminalization would allow willing adult prostitutes to seek protection
from being cheated or battered by customers, protection they dare not seek as
illegal sellers of sex.' Contrary to the argument of some feminist commenta-
tors, a contract between consenting adults to sell sexual services is not
slavery.5 Both the factory worker and the prostitute survive hard physical
labor by separating who they are from what they do. Just as the person on the
assembly line in a factory separates his personality from his hands and feet
and the part of the brain that makes them work, so the willing prostitute
separates her personality from her sexual equipment.6
In this paper, I will argue that the Supreme Court misconstrued the Mann
Act by failing to recognize basic principles of federalism and the distinction
between procedure and substance. First, the Tenth Amendment confirmed the
basic structure of federalism under the Constitution: that the national govern-
ment is one of delegated, enumerated powers, with the residuary powers
reserved to the states.7 The Supreme Court ignored this fundamental principle
in key decisions interpreting the Mann Act. It misinterpreted the Commerce
Clause by erroneously applying two key terms of the original Mann Act,
"debauchery" and "any other immoral purpose," to noncommercial sex. The
language of the 1986 amendment, "sexual activity for which any person can
be charged with a criminal offense," applies mostly to noncommercial
activity, such as rape and child sexual abuse.
Second, the Supreme Court misused a fundamental element of legal
classification: the distinction between procedure and substance. Constitu-
tional clauses delegating jurisdiction to the various federal and state courts are
procedural. Article Ill, Section 2 of the Constitution defines federal jurisdic-
tion, which includes all cases arising under the laws of the United States. The
words that give federal courts jurisdiction under the Mann Act are "in
interstate or foreign commerce. '
4 DAVID A.J. RiCHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW 116-27 (1982).
'For a survey of the literature, see Sibyl Schwarzenbach, Contractarians and Feminists
Debate Prostitution, 18 N.Y.U. REV. OF LAW & Soc. CHANGE 103 (1990).
6 CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 206-09 (1988).
7 See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 262 (Madison) (E. Boume, ed. 1947); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4. Wheat.) 316,404 (1819); U.S. CONST., amend. X. The recent decision
in United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), illustrates the continuing significance of
federalism. The Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded the power
of Congress under the Commerce Clause because the statute applied to the mere possession of
guns, not to transactions.
8 See Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1914). Though the girls in this
case were transported by interstate train, the Court noted that transportation by common carrier
was not essential to interstate commerce jurisdiction. An agent of defendants, paid to recruit
girls in Wisconsin for prostitution and bring them to Illinois, was in interstate commerce
regardless of the means of transport. Id.
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Congress should not encroach on the residual powers of the states by
giving the federal courts jurisdiction to decide substantive matters that are
reserved to the states. For example, a national wills act governing the validity
and probate of all wills that were transported by the mails or in interstate
commerce would use federal commerce and mails jurisdiction to preempt one
segment of the law of wills, an area of substantive law not enumerated in
Article I as federal. A federal tort statute that redefines negligence for all
automobile torts where the vehicle crossed state lines before the impact
causing damage to another's person or property would also use Commerce
Clausejurisdiction to invade state tort law. Similarly, "debauchery" and "any
other immoral purpose?' in the 1910 Mann Act and criminal sexual activity in
the 1986 Act, when not limited to commercial transactions, are of the same
character as a federal wills act or a federal auto torts act. These statutory
clauses have noncommercial aspects which the Constitution leaves to the
states to regulate; the national government cannot validly regulate them by
using the jurisdictional clause, "in interstate or foreign commerce."
II. THE SOCIAL ECONOMICS OF PROSTITUTION
One should view the demand for the services of female prostitutes in
terms of the basic biological instincts of males which testosterone induces, in
relation to the psychological desires of some males to have short-term, non-
emotional relations with females.9 Class and psychological attitudes dictate
the demand for paid sexual services in an industrial society.'" One substantial
group is comprised of very low-income males who believe that they have
insufficient income to court and financially support a permanent partner."
Another group of males has the adequate income to marry, but has psycholog-
ical problems that cause them to reject sustained emotional relations with a
female.' 2 A third group is married males who are not satisfied with sex in
their marriages. 3 The fourth group of males, married and unmarried, may
9 For a theoretical analysis of the demand and supply functions for prostitution, see
DARYL A. HELLMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CRwE 133-43 (1980).
1o See CHARLES WINICK & PAUL M. KINSIE, THE LIVELY COMMERCE: PRosTITUToN IN
THE UNITED STATES 193-206 (1971).
" Alfred C. Kinsey, Social Level and Sexual Outlet, in CLASS STATUS AND PoWER 300-
08 (R. Bendix and S. N. Lipset, eds. 1953).
12 Kingsley Davis, Prostitution, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 262-88 (R. K.
Merton and R. A. Nisbet, eds. 1961)
"3 Albert Ellis, Why MarriedMen Visit Prostitutes, 25 SExOLOGY 344-47 (1959).
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consider sexual variety an adventure that is less costly when purchased from
a prostitute. 14
The widespread existence of prostitution in industrial societies indicates
that the demand for sexual services is very great. The earliest survey evidence
was in the 1948 Kinsey Report."5 The survey estimated that three and a half
to four per cent of total U.S. male sexual activity involved prostitutes. 6 For
unmarried males, three point seven per cent of total sexual activity for those
in their late teens, over nine and a half percent for those between thirty and
forty and over fifteen percent for those over forty involved prostitutes. 7 The
estimate for married males was that about one percent of sexual activity
involved prostitutes.'" In the more recent period of sexual liberalism, demand
for prostitutes seems to have declined. A 1991 survey of males aged twenty
to thirty-nine reported that 6.7 per cent had at some time paid for sex.' 9 A
recent major study of sexuality reported that 8.6 per cent of persons aged
eighteen to fifty-nine had ever paid for sex, but in the twelve months of the
study only 0.4 per cent responded that they had paid for sex.2"
As for the supply of female prostitutes, the key inducement to enter the
industry is the perception that a prostitute can earn much more in this line of
work than in alternate employment.2' Many commentators have suggested
that the great majority of prostitutes are willing members of the profession
and that only a small percentage are unwilling workers under the total control
of pimps.2 Also, many drug addicts become prostitutes to finance their
addiction.23
14 For a consumer survey of reasons for visiting prostitutes, see WINICK & KINSIE, supra
note 10 at 193-98.
15A. C. KiNSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 286, 503 (1948).
161d.
17 id.
18 Id.
19 Daniel H KIepinger et al., Perceptions ofAIDS Risk and Severity and their Associa-
tion with Risk Related Behavior among U.S. Men, 25 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES (No.
2) 74, 79 (1993). The 1991 National Survey of Men contained 3,321 extended interviews.
20 EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SocIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY 402, 435
(1994).
2 1 HELENREYNOLDS, THE EcoNoMIcs OF PROSTITUTION 11-14 (1986).
' See Linda M. Rio, Psychological and Sociological Research and the Decriminaliza-
tion or Legalization of Prostitution, 20 ARCHIvEs OF SExuAL BEHAVIOR 205, 210 (1991) and
authorities cited therein.
23 Marsha Rosenbaum, Work and the Addicted Prostitute, in JUDGE LAWYER VICTIM
THIF 131-50 (Nicole H. Rafter and Elizabeth A. Stanko, eds. 1982); Jody Miller, Gender and
Power on the Streets: Street Prositution in the Era of Crack Cocaine, 23 J. CONTEMPORARY
ETHNOGRAPHY 427-52 (1995).
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In 1968, one survey estimated that there were 300,000 to 500,000
women and girls in the United States selling sexual services, full-time or part-
time.24 This would be approximately 0.3 to 0.6 per cent of the female
population ages fifteen to thirty-five. The gross revenues of these persons is
estimated at approximately $20 billion.25 One commentator, Helen Reynolds,
has explained the differences between different types of prostitutes and the
estimated fees for each type.26 These types include streetwalkers, masseuses,
escorts, bar prostitutes, call girls, and brothel inmates. The prices in the 1968
study ranged from as low as $10 for some streetwalkers to over $100 for
some call girls. The possibility of moving up the hierarchy from streetwalker
to. call girl was slim.27 At the higher income levels, pimp involvement
decreased and the danger of arrest declined.28 It was much more likely, in fact,
that over time a prostitute would move down the income hierarchy. If drug
problems increased, she might be less able to handle her affairs, fall under the
control of a pimp, and find it necessary to move into a brothel.
It is impossible to estimate the extent to which illegality limits the supply
of prostitutes.29 The general view is that prostitution is immoral because,
contrary to marriage and similar emotional alliances, prostitution is the
alienation of the body to the will of another and thus undermines the ultimate
roots of the moral personality.3" It is thus reasonable to hypothesize that even
if prostitution were legal, the number of prostitutes would not increase
substantially. Even presuming that legalization would raise prostitutes'
income because they would no longer need to share fees with madams, pimps,
lawyers or corrupt police, this advantage would be offset in part by income
taxes previously evaded and higher medical expenses under state health
regulations. Hence there is no reason to infer that incomes would rise enough
to encourage significant increase in entry into the profession.
Many of the problems and costs associated with prostitution would not
decrease with legalization.3' Since legal prostitutes could seek police assis-
tance, the costs of physical harm from pimps and customers should decrease,
though they would not disappear. The proportion of psychologically unbal-
anced customers would not be reduced. The risk of venereal disease would
24 CARL P. SIMON & ANN D. WHITE, BEATING THE SYSTEM: THE UNDERGROUND
ECONOMY 249-55 (1982); see also John D. Potterat et al., Estimating the Prevalence and
Career Longevity of Prostitute Women, 27 J. SEX RESEARCH 233-43 (1990).
2SId.
2 See REYNOLDS, supra note 21 at 14-16.
271d. at 15.
2 id.
29 For models of public policy, see id. at 35-59.
30 RicHAR S, supra note 4 at 94-95.
31 See REYNOLDS, supra note 21 at 16-18.
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remain high since the rate of condom failure would be the same. Since
prostitutes would not be arrested, the costs for legal services would go down,
although many other operating cost would remain the same. The psychologi-
cal cost of continuing a socially degrading occupation would continue and any
resulting addiction to drugs (including alcohol) would probably not decrease.
The decriminalization of prostitution should reduce one key social cost:
the cost of policing. This would enable the police to redistribute resources
they currently use to investigate and arrest individuals involved in prostitu-
tion. One 1985 study reported that in sixteen of the nation's largest cities,
only twenty-eight per cent of reported violent crimes resulted in arrests.3" At
the same time, police on average made as many arrests for prostitution as they
did for all violent crimes combined.33 Judges are overwhelmed by the sheer
number of prostitution arrests, and the consequent judicial leniency toward
prostitutes results in repeated arrests of the same offenders.34 As Professor
Packer concludes:
Because judges are not moral monsters, they rarely give convicted
prostitutes severe sentences. A short term in county jail is the
normal maximum. More often, a suspended jail sentence or a fre
is imposed. The woman may soon be back in court again.... The
whole tedious, expensive, degrading process of enforcement
activity produces no results: no deterrence, very little incapacita-
tion, and certainly no reform.35
Despite the increasing number of violent crimes involving guns, the United
States continues to devote a large portion of its scarce police resources to non-
violent misdemeanor prostitution arrests.
The great prevalence of prostitution in spite of its illegal status is similar
to the thriving alcohol industry in the 1920's in spite of the constitutional
prohibition of sale of alcoholic beverages and the criminal statutes enforcing
the amendment.36 Scholars commonly label this legal venture into prohibition
as "the experiment that failed."37 Consumption of alcohol did decrease
somewhat, but the social costs of illegal alcohol and the great expansion of
32 Julie Pearl, The Highest Paying Customers: America's Cities and the Costs of
Prostitution Control, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 769 (1987).
33 id.
34 Id. at 790.
35 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMiTS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 329 (1968).
36 U.S. CONST., amend. XVIII, repealed by amend. XXI.
37 See generally NORMAN H. CLARK, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN PROHIBITION, 158-80 (1976); ANDREW SINCLAIR, PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF
ExCEss 173-219 (1960).
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organized crime caused most citizens to welcome repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment.3" Similarly, the demand for prostitutes cannot be significantly
decreased by criminal statutes. The attempt to eliminate prostitution through
legislation has also failed.
Although prostitution has been labeled a victimless crime, in fact, it is
the prostitutes themselves who are victims, rendered such by the illegality of
their profession.39 Many prostitutes must work with pimps so that when
arrested they will have someone to supply bail money for them and hire a
lawyer.4 The police know the futility of trying to end prostitution by making
it a crime in a marketplace where there is a demand founded in psychological
and biological needs for commercial sexual services.41 Some proportion of
police accept bribes from prostitutes, pimps or brothel madams to refrain
from arrests.42 In any case, the social costs of arresting and prosecuting
prostitutes are essentially wasted since the defendants, when released, usually
return to prostitution.43
Most persons who have studied prostitution support its legalization and
state regulation." Hundreds of thousands of American women who have
chosen prostitution as a means of earning a living deserve the same police and
judicial protections as other citizens.45 Rather than expend public funds on
police vice squads, prosecutors, and jail space, all of which have a minimal
impact on the reduction of prostitution, the state could expend the same funds
on services to rehabilitate prostitutes.
Finally, the presence of AIDS adds further urgency to the argument for
decriminalization. The legalization of prostitution, followed by legislation
mandating periodic compulsory health examination of prostitutes, would
3 See Humbert S. Nelli, American Syndicate Crime: A Legacy of Prohibition, in LAW,
ALCOHOL, AND ORDER: PERSPECTIVEs ON NATIONAL PROHIBITON 123-27 (David E. Kyvig, ed.
1985).
39 See KAREN DECROW, SEXIST JUSTIcE 209 (1974); Charles Rosenbleet & Barbara J.
Pariente, The Prostitution of the CriminalLaw, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 373 (1973); M. Anne
Jennings, The Victim as Criminal: A Consideration of California's Prostitution Law, 64 CAL.
L. REV. 1235 (1976).
40 See WINICK &KNsiE, supra note 10, at 109-20.
41 See PACKER, supra note 35 at 328-3 1.
42 See WINIcK & KNsm, supra note 10 at 214.
41 See Llad Phillips & Harold L. Votey, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME CONTROL 71-72
(1981), citing cost data in E. Vorenberg & J. Vorenberg, The Biggest Pimp ofAll Prosecution
and Some Facts of Life, 239 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 1977, at 239.
"See text and sources cited in JOHN F. DECKER, PRosTITTON: REGULATION AND
CONTROL, ch. 9 (1979); Therese M. Wandling, Decriminalization ofProstitution: The Limits
of the CriminalLaw, 55 OREGON L. REV. 553, 560-63 (1976).
4
' RICHARDS, supra note 4 at 94-95.
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significantly improve the odds of reducing the spread of AIDS and other
sexually transmitted diseases.
III. IMMIGRATION LAW BACKGROUND
Examining the series of federal immigration laws that made importation
of prostitutes a crime is necessary before analyzing the Mann Act of 1910.
Section 3, enacted in 1875, made it a felony to import women into the United
States for the purpose of prostitution. 6 A 1903 amendment to the statute also
made it felonious to import any woman or girl, or hold one of them after
importation, for the purpose of prostitution.47 The Immigration Act of 1907,
made it a felony to import any alien woman or girl for the purpose of prostitu-
tion or any other immoral purpose.48
Unlike the Mann Act, legislators founded the Immigration Act on
principles of sovereignty. They did so by borrowing from international law
the principle that every nation has the power to control the entry of aliens: "It
is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self preservation, to forbid
the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe."4 9 The power to
control entry is thus crucial to a nation's protection of its sovereignty.
A second constitutional foundation of Section 3 of the Immigration Act
was the power of Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to enforce
treaties entered by the President under Article II, Section 2, that have received
senatorial consent." The Treaty of Paris of May 18, 1904 for repression of
trade in white women received senatorial consent on March 1, 1905. While
the President did not announce the United States' adherence to the treaty until
June 15, 1908, it can be argued that this was merely a delayed formality, and
that section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1907 was in part based on the 1905
senatorial consent to the treaty.5 1
46 18 Stat. 477 (1875).
4' 32 Stat. 1213 (1903).
48 34 Stat. 898 (1907), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1328 (1990).
49Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892), citing EMIR DE VATTEL,
LAWOFNATIONS, Book 2, §§94, 100 (J. Chitty, ed. 1858); R. PHILUMORE, I CoMMENTARjEs
UPON INTERNATiONAL LAW ch. 10, §219 (1854). See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889).
' This is pursuant to the sweeping clause of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See 45 CONG.
REC. 1034 (1910) (statement of Rep. Keifer), quoting John B. Moore, 5 DIGEST OF INTENA-
TIONAL LAW 166 (1906); Prevost v. Greenaux, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1 (1858).
5' See H.R. REP. No. 47, 61st Cong. 2d Sess., 13 (1909).
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The key opinion interpreting the phrase, "any other immoral purpose,"
in Section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1907 is United States v. Bitty. 2 Bitty
brought his mistress to the United States from England to live with him. He
demurred to the indictment charging him with a felony under Section 3. The
Circuit Court sustained the demurrer.53 Since the phrase "any other immoral
purpose" was ambiguous, the court turned to the report of the committee of
the House of Representatives to search for the context in which the phrase
was used.54 The report demonstrated that the phrase was added "in order to
prevent undesirable practices alleged to have grown up in relation to the
immigration of prostitutes.""5 Since this referred to commercial vice, the
court applied the rule of ejusdem generis and held that "other immoral
purpose" in this context had to be limited to commercial sale of sexual
services."6 Thus, a mistress was not a prostitute.
The Supreme Court reversed, ordering the Circuit Court to overrule the
demurrer.57 Bitty was to be tried as a felon. Justice Harlan for the Court
stated that "full effect must be given to the intention of Congress as gathered
from the words of the statute. 58 It was clear, however, that "for any other
immoral purpose" was ambiguous and required interpretation. Harlan
rejected the narrow application of ejusdem generis by the Circuit Court:
The prostitute may, in the popular sense, be more degraded in
character than the concubine, but the latter none the less must be
held to lead an immoral life, if any regard whatever be had to the
views that are almost universally held in this country as to the
relations which may rightfully, from the standpoint of morality,
exist between man and woman in the matter of sexual inter-
course.
59
Quoting Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Harlan explained that "though penal
laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be so strictly as to defeat the
obvious intention of the legislature."6
52208 U.S. 393 (1908).
3 United States v. Bitty, 155 F. 938 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1907).
54Id. at 939.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 939-40.
57 See Bitly, 208 U.S. 393.
58208 U.S. at 401.
591 d. at 402.
60id.
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Harlan ignored the Immigration Commission Report that considered only
commercial vice.61 The reasonable inference from the report should have been
that "any other immoral purpose" would relate to the importation of pimps,
madams and other managers of prostitutes and to paid sexual performers who
were not prostitutes. Without contextual foundation, Harlan concluded that
the statutory words implied an intention by Congress to view importation of
a mistress as an immoral purpose.
In 1934, the Supreme Court decided Hansen v. Hoff,6" which attempted
to limit the scope of the Bitty. It interpreted the language of Section 3 of the
Immigration Act of 1917, which excluded from admission to the United States
persons entering the country "for the purpose of prostitution or for any other
immoral purposes."63 Hansen involved a citizen of Denmark who resided in
Los Angeles. She entered a sexual relation with a married man but did not
live with him and was not supported by him. She traveled to Europe with him
and upon reentry to the United States was ordered deported. The Supreme
Court reversed the order of deportation and distinguished Bitty. In Bitty, the
phrase "any other immoral purpose" was applied to a mistress who lived with
the defendant and was supported by him. In Hansen, the Court held that
extramarital relations short of concubinage are outside the ejusdem generis
limits of immoral purpose.64 Here, the purpose of the journey was to visit her
parents and the purpose of the return to the United States was to resume her
legitimate job.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF THE MANN ACT
The Mann Act was originally called the "White Slave Traffic Act.""5
Section 2 of the Act made it a felony knowingly to transport in interstate or
foreign commerce or in the District of Columbia "any woman or girl for the
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose." 66
61 Id. at 401-02
62 291 U.S. 559 (1934).
63 39 Stat. 874 (1917).
4Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562.
Congress amended the statute in 1948 and deleted "White Slave Traffic Act." 62 Stat.
812.
66 36 Stat. 825 (1910):
Sec. 2. That any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be
transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in
transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or
in the District of Columbia, any woman or girl for the purpose of
prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with
the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl
to become a prostitute orto give herself up to debauchery, or to engage
[Vol.2:99
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Thus, although the popular name of the Act suggested otherwise, the opera-
tive language of the statute was not limited to white females. Since proposals
for the act had originated in the House Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization, it is clear that its first aim was to strengthen the existing law
against panderers and procurers in foreign commerce.67 Even after the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce took over the dominant role
in sponsoring the legislation, its report refers to the HR12315 bill as one "to
regulate and prevent the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of
alien women and girls for immoral purposes."6 However, the language of the
Mann Act in its final form made clear that it was not limited to alien women,
but applied to all women and girls in interstate and foreign commerce.
The debates in Congress and the committee reports make it clear that the
objective was to punish panderers and procurers of unwilling prostitutes,
those who were equivalent to slaves.69 The legislative record shows that the
legislators did not consider what percentage of women were forced into
prostitution. This is significant because it lead to the erroneous inference that
most white prostitutes were enslaved. The legislative history demonstrates
that Congress intended the courts to apply the three statutory
terms-prostitution, debauchery, and "any other immoral purpose'-only to
commercialized vice. This view should have been reinforced by the rule of
in any other immoral practice; or who shall knowingly procure or
obtain, or cause to be procured or obtained, or aid or assist in procuring
or obtaining any ticket or tickets, or any form of transportation or
evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in
interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or the District of
Columbia, in going to any place for the purpose of prostitution of
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent or
purpose on the part of such person to induce, entice, or compel her to
give herself up to the practice of prostitution, or to give herself up to
debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whereby any such woman
or girl shall be transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any
Territory or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and upon conviction, thereof shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment of not more than
five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of
the court.
67 IPORTATION AmD HARBORiNG OF WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, S. Doc. 753, 61 st
Cong., 3d Sess. 68-69 (1910). This report is not limited to white women; it devotes two pages
to Chinese and Japanese women. Id at 68-69.
68 White Slave Traffic Act, H.R. Rep. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1909).
69 "The characteristic which distinguishes 'the white slave trade' from immorality in
general is that the women who are the victims of the traffic are unwillingly forced to practice
prostitution." Id. at 10. Congressman Saunders quoted the Immigration Commission Report
with similar statements. 45 CON. REC. 1037 (1910). See GRrrTNER, supra note 3, at 86-91.
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statutory construction that penal statutes shall be narrowly construed in order
to protect the accused.7 °
Under the language of the statute, panderers and procurers were not the
only potential felons. The Supreme Court held in Hays v. United States71 that
a prostitute's potential customer could be indicted for a felony if he supplied
her a train ticket for interstate travel for the purpose of having sexual inter-
course with him. Any male traveler who employed a prostitute, and without
knowledge of the Mann Act took her across a state line, would likely be
willing, to pay blackmail rather than ruin himself and his family in a felony
trial.72
The Congressmen who drafted the Mann Act seem to have paid no
attention to the possibility that some of the supposed victims, willing prosti-
tutes, might also find themselves felons. Any willing prostitute ran the risk
that she could be indicted along with her procurer. When this issue was
finally considered in United States v. Holte,73 the Supreme Court held that the
prostitute could be prosecuted for conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. Clara
Holte was indicted under the U.S. Penal Conspiracy Act of 1909'4 for
conspiring with one Laudenschleger to transport herself from Illinois to
Wisconsin for the purpose of prostitution. Justice Holmes, for the majority,
reversed the District Court decision which held that the woman was not a
party to the offense, but only the victim. Holmes recognized that the general
language of the Mann Act could be interpreted to include not only the "white
slave," but also the willing professional prostitute who was not a victim. If
the woman were the first to suggest the crime of transportation in commerce
for the purpose of prostitution, she was guilty as a conspirator.75 Justice
Lamar dissented, pointing out that the Mann Act was aimed only at panderers
and procurers and treated the women as victims.76 He felt that mere consent
of the woman could not change her statutory status from victim to wrongdoer,
70 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. §59.03 (4th ed. 1986).
71 Hays v. United States, 231 F. 106 (8th Cir. 1916), aff'd, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). The
application of the Mann Act to a defendant transporting a willing prostitute in the District of
Columbia was affirmed in United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193 (1945).
72 See LANGUM, supra note 3 at 77-96. There are no estimates of the total numbers or
dollar amounts of such extortion since 1910.
73 236 U.S. 140 (1915). See Marlene J. Beckman, The White Slave Traffic Act: The
Historical Impact of a Criminal Law Policy on Women, 72 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1111 (1984).
74 35 Stat. 1096 (1909).
7' 236 U.S. at 145. The Court later held that mere consent of the woman to be trans-
ported in violation of the Mann Act cannot be the basis of a conspiracy prosecution against her.
She must have been an active planner of the violation to be validly charged with conspiracy.
Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932).
76 236 U.S. at 146 (Lamar, J. dissenting).
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since "[t]o hold otherwise would make the law of conspiracy a sword with
which to punish those whom the traffic act was intended to protect. '"77
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Mann Act in Hoke
v. United States.7" In that case, Effie Hoke and Basil Economides were
charged with knowingly inducing Annette Baden and her sisters to travel from
New Orleans, Louisiana to Beaumont, Texas for the purpose of prostitution.
The trial court overruled a demurrer that challenged the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate transportation of women for
prostitution.79 After trial and conviction, the defendants appealed. The
Supreme Court affirmed."0 Justice McKenna, writing for the Court, empha-
sized the great breadth of the Commerce Clause: "The power is direct; there
is no word of limitation in it, and its broad and universal scope has been so
often declared as to make repetition unnecessary."81 He did not treat the issue
that is argued here, the distinction between jurisdiction and substance. The
substantive object of the transportation in Hoke was prostitution, commercial
transactions in sex. It was correctly subsumed under the plenary power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause to regulate all transactions among the
several states.82 While citations were unnecessary in a constitutional ruling,
McKenna cited the transport of lottery tickets and impure food for the purpose
of sale in other states as analogous violations of statutes based on the Com-
merce Clause.8
3
The first case where the issue of federalism was raised in reference to the
Mann Act is Athanasaw v. United States. 4 Here there was no charge of
prostitution or any other commercial vice. Defendants were charged with
violating the Mann Act for transporting a girl for the purpose of debauchery.
Seventeen-year-old Agnes Couch responded to an advertisement for chorus
girls in Atlanta and signed a contract to appear in Tampa, Florida. On
Couch's first day at the Tampa theater, members of the company made
improper sexual advances toward her, and the police were called. Defendants
Athanasaw and Sampson, operators of the theater, were indicted, convicted of
debauchery, and sentenced to prison. On appeal, the convictions were
affirmed. Justice McKenna, writing for the Court, upheld the following jury
I d. at 148 (Lamar, I. dissenting).
78227 U.S. 308 (1913).
79United States v. Hoke, 187 F. 992 (D.C.E.D.Tex., 1911).
8oHoke, 227 U.S. at 320.
Id.
8See WIIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICs AND THE CONSTrrUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 84-186 (1953); MICHAEL CONANT, THE CoNsTIUION AND THE ECONOMY:
OBJECTIVE THEORY AND CRITICAL COMMENTARY 90-92 (199 1).
I Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S.
45(1911).
84 227 U.S. 326 (1913). See Langum, supra note 3, at 72-75.
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instructions on the meaning of debauchery: "to corrupt in morals or princi-
ples; to lead astray morally into dishonest and vicious practices; to lead into
unchastity."' s The question in this case was "whether the employment to
which the defendants called the girl and the influences with which they
surrounded her tended to induce her to give herself up to a condition of
debauchery which eventually, necessarily, and naturally would lead to a course
of immorality sexually."86
Athanasaw did not involve commercial vice. Vulgar language had
shocked the modesty of the girl, and the police rescued her fifteen minutes
later. The substance of the offense had no commercial aspect. Debauchery
that did not propose or lead to paid transactions in sex had no foundation in
the Commerce Clause. Therefore, the indictment should have been
dismissed. 7
In Caminetti v. United States,88 the Court had to interpret the statutory
language, "for any other immoral purpose." The defendants were two young
married men from California who took their mistresses by train to Nevada for
a weekend that included sexual relations. There was no evidence that the
women were paid and the indictment did not charge the defendants with
transporting the women across state lines for the purpose of prostitution.
Caminetti and Diggs were convicted on counts relating to immoral purpose,
and the conviction was affirmed.
Attorneys for the defendants argued that the statute was limited to
commercial vice. They cited the title of the statute, the White Slave Traffic
Act, and the Congressional committee reports that concerned only sale of
sexual services.89 They also relied upon an opinion of the Attorney General,
in a case of potential prosecution of a customer of a prostitute, that the
element of traffic was absent and that such the case was not "within the spirit
and intent of the Mann Act."90 The attorneys failed to make the argument
suggested here that the constitutional allocations of governing power barred
federal prosecution of non-commercial sex under a penal statute enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Justice Day, for the majority, wrote that the meaning of the language of
the Mann Act was unambiguous, therefore a duty of interpretation did not
227 U.S. at 331.
6 Id. at 332.
87 While Athanasaw was not overruled, the Supreme Court in 1954 repudiated the
doctrine of "leading into temptation." United States v. Amadio, 215 F.2d 605 (7th Cir.), revd
per curiam, 348 U.S. 892 (1954).
" 242 U.S. 470 (1917). See LANGUM, supra note 3, at 97-138; R. ANDERSON, THE
DIGGS-CAMINETTI CASE 1913-1917: FOR ANY OTHER IMMORAL PURPOSE, 2 Vols. (1990).
9 61 L.Ed. 447 (1917).
90 Caminetti,242 U.S. at 498.
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arise.9" He held that "immoral purpose" could be used in its "ordinary and
usual sense" when applied to transporting a mistress.92 He then referred to the
immigration case of United States v. Bitty,9' where "any other immoral
purpose" was applied to importing a mistress. He seems to have observed no
distinction between moral standards in an immigration act based on a princi-
ple of the law of nations and the Mann Act based on the Commerce Clause, an
enumerated power limited to transactions.
In applying the rule of construction of ejusdem generis, Justice Day
again refused to limit "any other immoral purpose" to commercial vice.94
Here again, he emphasized that the plain meaning of "immoral purpose"
determined the construction, and that this went beyond commercial vice.
In this crucial case, giving the first authoritative construction of "any
other immoral purpose" under the Mann Act, counsel failed to argue, and the
court failed to take into account, the interaction between the issues of federal-
ism and the procedure/substance distinction. The statutory phrase "in
interstate or foreign commerce" was ajurisdictional clause needed to bring the
issue before the federal courts. The substantive regulation referred to trans-
portation of women and girls for prostitution, debauchery or any other
immoral purpose. Here the second fundamental issue, determining whether
the substance of the statute can be subsumed under a constitutionally enumer-
ated power, comes into play. Only prostitution concerned commercial
transactions under Commerce Clause regulation. Debauchery and immorality
were non-commercial. These items were reserved to the states just as much as
regulating the making of wills or defining negligence in local auto torts.
Justice McKenna, who four years earlier in Athanasaw had pushed non-
commercial debauchery into the same genus as commercial prostitution,
dissented in Caminetti.95 McKenna rejected the majority view that "any other
immoral purpose" was unambiguous. 96 If the term was not to cover all of
human morality, judicial construction of the language was necessary. The
Court had to choose between all sexual immorality or sexual immorality in
91 Frankfurter has asserted that "the notion that because the words of a statute are plain,
its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification. It is a wooden English
doctrine of rather recent vintage... to which lip service has on occasion been given here, but
which since the days of Marshall this Court has rejected, especially in practice... A statute,
like other living organisms, derives significance and substance from its environment, from
which it cannot be severed without being mutilated." United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 427,
431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I This was in effect a denial of a diversity of value judgments about morals in American
society. Compare the view that moral conduct is a subjective concept. TAMOTSU SHIBUTANI,
SocL PROcESSEs 166-68 (1986); see MORRIS GINSBERG, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY: ONTHEDivERsrrYoFMORALS, Vol. 1, (1956).
1 208 U.S. 393 (1908).
14 242 U.S. at 487.
' 242 U.S. at 496. Chief Justice White and Justice Clarke joined in this dissent.
96242 U.S. at 496-97
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commercial transactions. As noted above, the committee reports demon-
strated that the objective of Congress was to stop panderers and procurers in
interstate commerce.
Mortensen v. United States97 posed a factual situation that demonstrated
that even the language "transport in interstate commerce".. . "for the purpose
of prostitution" could be ambiguous. The Mortensens, who operated a house
of prostitution in Grand Island, Nebraska, planned a vacation trip by auto to
Salt Lake City, Utah. Two prostitutes, who were employees of the defen-
dants, asked to come along for the vacation. After the vacation, all four drove
back to Nebraska and the prostitutes reentered their trade at the Mortensen
house. The Mortensens were indicted for transporting the women across state
lines for the purpose of prostitution, were tried by a jury, and convicted. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by a vote of 2 to 1 8
The Supreme Court reversed by a vote of 5 to 4. Writing for the
majority, Justice Murphy found that there was a lack of relevant evidence
from which the jury could properly find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
trip was for the purpose of prostitution within the meaning of the Mann Act.99
The return journey was part of the vacation and not for the purpose of
prostitution. 100
The great "liberals" on the Court dissented. Chief Justice Stone, for
himself, and Justices Black, Douglas and Reed, argued that the jury finding
was supported by ample evidence. 1' 1 But the only evidence was that the
women willingly chose to return to commercial vice. This was another case in
which counsel for defendants failed to raise and argue explicitly the rule for
strict construction of penal statutes. 0 2 The presumptions arising out of that
rule should have given strong additional support for the defendants.
In Cleveland v. United States, 3 Mormons who transported plural wives
across state lines in their private automobiles for purpose of cohabitation were
convicted of violating the Mann Act.0 4 As in the Mortensen case, the
preliminary issue of federal jurisdiction was ignored.
Justice Douglas, for the majority, affirmed the conviction. He cited the
Bitty case as a "forceful precedent" for construction of the phrase "immoral
purpose" in the Mann Act failing to note that the statute in the Bitty case
arose under the inherent national power to limit immigration, not the com-
" 322 U.S. 369 (1944).
98 Mortensen v. United States, 139 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 1943).
'9 322 U.S. at 375.
100 Id.
"' 322 U.S. at 377.
102 SINGER, supra note 70 at § 59.03.
'0' 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
104 United States v. Cleveland, 59 F. Supp. 890 (D.C. Utah 1944), aff'd 146 F.2d 730
(10th Cir. 1945).
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merce clause. 5 Thus, "immoral purpose" that had been applied to mistresses
in Bitty was projected without penetrating analysis into the Mann Act in
Caminetti. This was the shaky foundation for asserting that the Mann Act.
was not limited to commercial sex. Without recognition of the limited scope
of the commerce clause as an enumerated national power, he held the ejusdem
generis rule of construction could not be used "more narrowly than the class
of which they are a part.""'6 Immoral non-commercial sex included polygamy,
which was illegal under state laws. After noting that polygamy was not
commerce, Douglas concluded: "the power of Congress over the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce is plenary; it may be used to defeat what are
deemed to be immoral practices; and the fact that the means used may have
the quality of police regulations is not consequential."'0 7
Justices Black and Jackson dissented with a one-sentence explanation:
"They are of the opinion that affirmance requires extension of the rule
announced in the Caminetti case and that the correctness of that rule is so
dubious that it should at least be restricted to its particular facts."'0'
Justice Murphy wrote a much longer dissent, first emphasizing the
relativity of morals: "Polygamy, like other forms of marriage, is basically a
cultural institution rooted deeply in the religious beliefs and social mores of
those societies in which it appears."109 Applying the ejusdem generis rule to
include such marriages, he argued, "ignores reality and results in an unfair
application of the statutory words."'10 Murphy emphasized that the title to the
White Slave Traffic Act and the Congressional reports on which the Act was
based limited the law to unwilling prostitution, a narrow purpose with
absolutely no connection to the practice of polygamy.
Justice Rutledge wrote a concurring opinion that was more realistically
a dissent."' He opined that the Caminetti- decision was wrong, as Justice
McKenna's dissent in that case demonstrated. He believed that Congress'
failure to amend the Mann Act in order to correct the Caminetti error was not
an approval of Caminetti. Silence of Congress is not automatic approval, he
cautioned, especially when the charge is the broadening of a penal statute in
violation of the rule of strict construction."12 The pressure of business and
many political forces may interfere with Congressional review of court
decisions and consequent statutory revision. Rutledge concurred only because
"' 329 U.S. at 16.
101Id. at 18.
I 7Id. at 19.
'"
8 Id. at 20-21.
"I9Id. at 26.
I0 1d. at 25.
"Id. at 21-24.
112 id.
1996]
116 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
five members of the Court refused to overrule Caminetti. He thus adhered to
strict application of stare decisis to statutes. Like the other justices, he did not
realize that there was a constitutional issue here. Under federalism, the
Congress has no power to regulate non-commercial sex. If the constitutional
issue had been briefed and argued, the Court could have adopted constitu-
tional reasoning that rejects stare decisis.13 As Justice Frankfurter had earlier
noted, "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself,
and not what [the Court has] said about it.""' 4
After World War I[, and especially after 1960, society's opinion of
sexual freedom changed radically.'"5 Even before the 1986 Amendment to the
Mann Act, the policy of the Justice Department had been to limit investiga-
tions and prosecutions to procurers and panderers of prostitutes. It was only
when citizens filed complaints that female family members had been per-
suaded to cross state lines for private sex that there were prosecutions. 6
Additionally, while counsel have failed to argue the principle of strict con-
struction of penal statutes, some lower courts in this era of greater sexual
permissiveness had sought to limit the scope of the Mann Act. In United
States v. Prater,'7 for example, the court reversed the conviction of a female
transporter. Della Marie Prater had driven herself and Vivian Dearing from
Missouri to Illinois under a contract to perform a striptease act at a party. At
the party, Dearing engaged in sex for money. There was no evidence at trial
that the defendant had known her partner would engage in prostitution. Thus
the statutory requirement that she "knowingly transport for purpose of
prostitution" was not met."8
In 1986 Congress finally found a way to limit the terms in the Mann Act
that had attempted in vain to legislate morality. The technique used to evade
outcry by moral fundamentalists was to emphasize that the primary purpose
was to make the law gender neutral. Secondly, the amendments were hidden
in the Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986." 9 The terms
"debauchery" and "other immoral purpose" were deleted. In their place, the
statute criminalized the knowing transport of any individual in interstate or
foreign commerce with intent that such individual engage in prostitution "or
"
3 The power in the Supreme Court in constitutional cases to overrule past similar cases
that the Court Rules were in error overrides the principle of strict application of stare decisis to
statutes. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 57-60 (1961).
14 Graves v. United States, 306 U.S. 466,491 (1939).
'5See LANGUM, supra note 3, at 221-41.
"
6 See, e.g., United States v. Marks, 274 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1959); Reamer v. United
States, 318 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 869.
117 United States V. Prater, 518 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1975). See United States v. Love, 592
F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1979).
"
8 Prater, 518 F.2d at 820.
"
9 Pub.L. No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3511-12 (1986).
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in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal
offense." ' Both the former Section 3, which related to coercion and entice-
ment, and the former Section 4, which related to girls under eighteen, required
transport on an interstate common carrier. The 1986 amendments dropped
that requirement and adopted the same language as the first section.
The new language in effect requires an intent to violate state criminal law
relating to sexual activity. To the extent that states have repealed criminal
statutes for fornication and adultery, the Mann Act can no longer be used to
prosecute unmarried couples who cross state lines for a weekend of cohabita-
tion. But most state criminal laws relating to sexual activity other than
prostitution are not for paid activity. In other words, they are not commercial.
Knowingly transporting persons across state lines for noncommercial sex
crimes cannot be validly subsumed under the Commerce Clause. The issue of
federalism should be argued in all such prosecutions.
V. CONCLUSION
If the social scientists and other critics who view the illegality of prosti-
tution as a failed social regulation are correct, the Mann Act as amended and
state penal laws against consensual prostitution by adults should be repealed
and replaced by comprehensive health regulation. The moral panic of 1910
when the Mann Act was enacted has long passed, and the modem era of
sexual liberalism should lead to its repeal. The Mann Act was never needed
20The current offense provisions are as follows:
§ 2421. Transportation generally
"Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in
any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual engage
in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a
criminal offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
§ 2422. Coercion and enticement
"Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel in
interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, to
engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with
a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
§ 2423. Transportation of minors
"Whoever knowingly transports any individual under the age of 18 years in interstate or
foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that
such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can
be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both.
100 Stat. 3511.
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as a supplement to state penal laws against pimps and procurers. The
evidence indicates the futility of the laws against prostitution by willing
adults. The onset of AIDS makes health regulation of prostitutes the primary
concern. Now is the time for Congress to Repeal the Mann Act.
